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El	Salvador’s	experience	of	UN	peacebuilding	reveals
the	ineffectiveness	of	‘development	as	usual’
approaches
To	provide	the	vital	“peace	dividend”	of	better	lives	and	livelihoods,	peacebuilding	must	promote
conflict-sensitive	policies	even	where	they	are	economically	second-best.	The	UN	can	support	this
process	by	helping	states	in	transition	to	reactivate	their	economies	in	an	inclusive	and	sustainable
manner,	writes	Graciana	del	Castillo	(City	University	of	New	York).
Important	anniversaries	provide	an	opportunity	to	reflect	on	lessons	of	the	past	and	rethink	strategies
for	the	future.	Sadly,	25	years	after	their	creation,	the	UN’s	Peacekeeping	and	Political	Affairs	departments	have
a	disappointing	record	when	it	comes	to	peacebuilding.
As	my	new	book	Obstacles	to	Peacebuilding	shows,	more	than	half	of	the	21	countries	to	undergo	a	war-to-peace
transition	with	the	civilian	and	military	support	of	the	UN	have	returned	to	conflict	within	ten	years.	And	even	those
that	achieved	a	tenuous	peace	ended	up	highly	aid	dependent,	often	even	for	basic	food	needs.	Complacency	and
unfinished	business	can	easily	turn	a	promising	transition	into	a	failing	situation.
Most	UN-backed	transitions	have	returned	to	conflict	within	ten	years	(Isaac	Billy,	UN	Photo,	CC
BY-NC-ND	2.0)
Recognising	the	peculiarities	of	post-Cold	War	peacebuilding
In	the	aftermath	of	the	Cold	War,	transitions	to	peace	were	especially	complex	because	the	states	involved	had	low
levels	of	development	and	were	emerging	from	intra-	rather	than	inter-state	wars.
They	faced	a	multi-pronged	challenge:	violence	had	to	give	way	to	stability	and	security;	lawlessness	and	political
exclusion	had	to	give	way	to	the	rule	of	law	and	participatory	governance;	ethnic,	religious,	or	class	polarisation	had
to	give	way	to	national	reconciliation	so	that	former	combatants	could	live	together	in	peace	within	the	same
communities;	and	ravaged,	underground	war	economies	had	to	become	functioning	economies	that	would	enable
ordinary	people	to	support	themselves	with	dignity	and	legality.
On	the	surface,	the	UN	was	the	logical	choice	to	lead	these	reconstruction	efforts.		Unlike	development	organisations
such	as	the	World	Bank	and	UNDP,	which	are	mandated	to	work	with	governments,	the	Secretary	General	could	use
the	impartiality	of	his	position	to	deal	equally	with	state	and	non-state	parties	to	the	conflict.
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Yet,	time	and	again	the	UN	has	shown	not	only	a	lack	of	analytical	and	operational	capacity,	but	also
an	unwillingness	to	address	this	failing.	Instead,	the	patchy	institutional	memory	of	the	UN	has	led	both	its	member-
states	and	its	officials	to	repeatedly	reinvent	the	wheel	without	realising	they	are	mostly	pedalling	in	mid-air.	As	such,
the	organisation	has	failed	to	learn	from	some	of	its	earlier	and	more	successful	operations,	not	least	in	El	Salvador,
which	was	the	first	start-to-finish	UN	mediation	of	an	internal	conflict.
Learning	from	El	Salvador	
El	Salvador’s	experience	diverges	from	the	UN’s	generally	poor	record	for	two	main	reasons:
1.	 Compliance	with	the	peace	agreement	led	to	a	perfectly	observed	ceasefire.
2.	 The	country	managed	to	keep	the	peace	without	becoming	aid	dependent	in	the	process.
With	the	country	at	the	brink	of	war	only	nine	months	after	the	peace	agreement	of	January	1992,	El	Salvador
provided	early	evidence	of	many	of	obstacles	to	peacebuilding	that	would	later	plague	transitions	to	peace	elsewhere
in	the	world.	Essentially,	El	Salvador	showed	that	when	economic	reconstruction	took	place	alongside	efforts	at
national	reconciliation	and	major	reforms	to	politics	and	security,	it	was	fundamentally	different	from	“development	as
usual”.
Early	success	in	achieving	peace	was	undermined	by	the	“development	as	usual”	approach	of
international	institutions	(Scottmontreal,	CC	BY-NC	2.0)
The	many	parallel	aspects	of	the	transition	restricted	economic	reconstruction	options,	not	least	because	each	had	to
compete	for	scarce	resources,	thereby	forcing	tough	choices	over	budgetary	allocations.	Since	avoiding	a	return	to
conflict	is	paramount,	the	“political	or	peace”	objective	must	always	prevail	over	the	“development	or	economic”	one,
meaning	that	first-best	economic	policies	are	often	neither	possible	nor	desirable	during	transition.
Yet,	the	UN	and	the	Bretton	Woods	institutions	operated	under	the	“development-as-usual”	paradigm,	as	if	there
were	no	high	risk	of	conflict	during	the	transition,	and	ultimately	worked	at	cross	purposes.	Fiscal	and	external
conditionality	under	the	1992	IMF-sponsored	economic	program	failed	to	incorporate	the	budgetary	implications	of
the	peace	agreement,	thereby	imposing	serious	restrictions	on	the	implementation	of	costly	peace-related	programs.
These	included	arms-for-land	swaps	and	the	establishment	of	a	civilian	police	force,	both	of	which	were	critical	to	the
agreement.
LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog: El Salvador’s experience of UN peacebuilding reveals the ineffectiveness of ‘development as usual’ approaches Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-01-10
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2018/01/10/el-salvadors-experience-of-un-peacebuilding-reveals-the-ineffectiveness-of-development-as-usual-
approaches/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/
The	longer	term	realisation	was	that	just	as	political	reform,	national	reconciliation,	and	economic	reconstruction
efforts	can	prove	futile	without	security,	it	is	also	the	case	that	security	will	not	take	root	without	progress	in	those
three	areas.	This	two-way	relationship	between	security	and	economy	–	often	neglected	by	the	UN	in	favour	of	a
greater	focus	on	human	rights,	elections,	and	gender	issues	–	has	proved	to	be	a	major	obstacle	to	successful	and
sustainable	transitions	to	peace,	stability,	and	improved	welfare.
Despite	broad	agreement	on	the	successful	implementation	of	the	National	Reconstruction	Plan	for	1992-97,	El
Salvador’s	removal	from	Security	Council	oversight	and	cuts	in	donor	assistance	ultimately	undermined	the
sustainability	of	its	impacts.	More	specifically,	the	Security	Council	gave	the	United	Nations	Development
Programme	(UNDP),	coordinator	of	the	UN	development	system,	leadership	over	“unfinished	business”.	Under
UNDP,	however,	many	significant	gains	were	lost	and	the	peace	process	withered.
Lacking	support,	former	combatants	had	to	abandon	programmes	like	arms-for-land	that	had	given	them	a	stake,
however	small,	in	the	peace	process.	This	often	left	them	with	no	option	but	to	resort	to	illegal	or	criminal	activities.
Together	with	President	Clinton’s	unfortunate	policy	of	repatriating	hundreds	of	undocumented	Salvadoran	gang
members	that	had	arrived	during	the	war,	this	led	to	rising	crime	and	public	insecurity,	which	in	turn	became	the
country’s	most	serious	obstacle	to	investment	and	a	viable	economy.
The	path	to	peace	dividends
With	El	Salvador	now	considered	by	most	accounts	a	failed	state,	the	lesson	for	the	UN,	as	well	as	for	Colombia	and
other	countries	undergoing	transitions	to	peace,	is	that	economic	reconstruction	of	war-torn	societies	is	not
“development	as	usual”.	On	the	contrary,	it	requires	a	new	paradigm	to	ensure	that	conflict	and	insecurity	will	not	be
revived.
This	paradigm	requires	conflict-sensitive	policies,	even	if	they	are	second-best	from	an	economic	point	of	view.	UN
support	must	act	in	parallel	to	help	countries	reactivate	their	economies	in	an	inclusive	and	sustainable	manner.
Only	in	this	way	can	we	achieve	a	popular	“peace	dividend”	in	terms	of	better	lives	and	livelihoods,	which	is	the	key
to	garnering	meaningful	support	for	any	country’s	efforts	to	build	peace,	stability,	and	prosperity.
Notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	and	do	not	reflect	the	position	of	the	Centre	or	of	the	LSE
•	This	article	draws	on	the	author’s	monograph	Obstacles	to	Peacebuilding	(Routledge,	2017)
•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commenting
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